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ARE KOSHER FOOD LAWS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY KOSHER? 
Catherine Beth Sullivan* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Ten years ago, only 1,000 products bore a kosher seal of approvaU 
In 1989, this figure was up to 17,500.2 Some kosher marketing experts 
estimate that approximately six million Americans purchase kosher 
food in the supermarket.3 Of these people, a mere 1.5 million are 
Jewish.4 Most consumers of kosher products are people who believe 
that the kosher designation means higher-quality food.5 
An increasing number of non-Jewish consumers purchase kosher 
food today because they perceive it as better quality and healthier.6 
Because the Food and Drug Administration has its hands full with 
steroids and drugs, many consumers believe that it does not ade-
* Executive Editor, 1993-1994, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 See Caroline E. Meyer, Rabbis' Seal of Appraval, Who's Keeping Kosher Now?, WASHING-
TON POST, September 27, 1989, at E 1. The kosher seal of approval is a symbol placed on a food 
label which informs the consumer that a product has been inspected by a supervising rabbi and 
a large certifying organization. They endorse the product as conforming to the laws of kashruth. 
The kosher seal may come in several different forms. For example, individual rabbis across the 
country use the letter "K" to indicate that a product has kosher supervision. However, because 
the symbol "K" is a letter of the alphabet, and cannot be copyrighted, many rabbis question 
buying products with a "K" symbol since anyone could print the letter "K" on a label. Thus, in 
addition to a letter "K," there are at least eight other copyrighted symbols to designate 
supervision. An "0" with a "U" at the center is the most common of these. Other symbols are 
used to show that the product is kosher for Passover. Still other symbols appear on wine. See 
id. at EI-E2; Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State of New Jersey, 579 A.2d 316, 324 n.15 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), rev'd 608 A.2d 1353, 1366 (N.J. 1992). 
2 See Meyer, supra note 1, at E1. 
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quately supervise the food business as it should.7 For these kosher 
food consumers, the kosher designation serves as a check. It means 
that a rabbi has been to the food processor's company and has in-
spected the equipment. This leads many consumers to conclude that 
the product is going to be more hygienic.8 Thus, the kosher designa-
tion is like a "Good Housekeeping seal of approval."9 
One reason behind the surge in the number of products certified as 
kosher and the number of food processors seeking the kosher cer-
tification is a basic business motivation.10 Rabbi Hillel Klavan, chair-
man of the Rabbinical Council of Greater Washington, explains that 
"[ v ]ery few of these establishments are in it for the love of religion. 
It's a marketing system, a profit-making endeavor."ll It does not cost 
much to be designated as "kosher," and the designation may bring 
higher sales. Thus, for companies seeking to gain market share, a 
kosher seal of approval can be a valuable asset.12 
It was precisely this profit-seeking motivation that prompted the 
State of New York to enact legislation in 1915 regulating the sale of 
kosher food products.13 Allegedly, in the late nineteenth century, 
profiteers were passing off non-kosher food as kosher.14 The State of 
New York sought to prevent such fraudulent or deceptive practices 
in order to protect the consumer by regulating the market.15 A num-
ber of states followed the New York example, adopting kosher food 
laws modelled after the New York statute.16 Since their inception, 
there have been numerous constitutional challenges to these kosher 
food laws on vagueness, due process, equal protection, and First 
Amendment grounds.17 Until the most recent New Jersey Supreme 
Court case of Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State of New Jersey,18 
the courts had consistently upheld the constitutionality of kosher food 






12 See id. 
13 Marc D. Stern, Kosher Food and the Law, 39 JUDAISM 389, 389 (Fall 1990). 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See generally Earl L. Kellett, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Regulations Deal-
ing with Misrepresentation in the Sale of Kosher Food, 52 A.L.R. 3d 959 (1973). 
18 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State of New Jersey, 608 A.2d 1353, 1366 (N.J. 1992). 
19 See generally Kellett, supra note 17, at 961. See also Barghout v. Mayor, 600 A.2d 841, 842 
(Md. 1992). 
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food statute was struck down.20 In this case, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court decided that aNew Jersey statute regulating the sale of kosher 
food was unconstitutional since it violated the Establishment Clauses 
of both the federal and state Constitutions.21 This decision is sig-
nificant because it calls into question the validity of other states' 
kosher food statutes which are similar to New Jersey's law.22 
This Comment analyzes the constitutionality as well as the neces-
sity of the various states' kosher food legislation. Part II of this 
Comment provides an overview of the dietary laws of kashruth.23 Part 
III looks at the origins of kosher food statutes in the United States. 
Part IV gives an overview of the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause. Part V discusses the history of cases which have 
interpreted kosher food regulations. Parts VI and VII analyze kosher 
food laws in light of potential Establishment Clause and Freedom of 
Religion concerns. Finally, Part VIII analyzes kosher food laws in 
light of the states' interests in protecting consumers who seek out kosher 
products for various reasons, such as religious and health concerns. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF KOSHER 
The general term for the Jewish dietary laws is kasher or kashruth, 
known in English as "kosher."24 The concept of kosher is not an easy 
one to define. The closest English words to describe "kosher" would 
be "fit" or "proper."25 The word kashruth only appears in the Scrip-
tures three times and even then it is not related to food require-
ments.26 Nevertheless, the word "kosher" has been understood for 
hundreds of years to signify the system of Jewish dietary laws.27 
Although the kosher dietary laws originally derived from biblical law, 
they have developed over time through rabbinical legislation and 
custom.28 Much of the material in the Talmud, a collection of the oral 
supplement to the Torah (the first five books of the Old Testament),29 
focuses on these laws.30 
20 Ran-Day's County Kosher, Inc., 608 A.2d at 1366. 
21Id. 
22 See id. 
23 See infra text accompanying notes 20-53. 
24 ALAN UNTERMAN, JEWS: THEIR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES 201 (1981). 
25 HERMAN WOUK, THIS Is My GOD 128 (1989). 
26 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 26 (1971), cited in Ran-Day's County Kosher, Inc. y. State of 
New Jersey, 579 A.2d 316, 320 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Diy. 1990). 
27 Ran-Day's County Kosher, Inc., 579 A.2d at 320. 
28 Id. at 320 n.8. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 320. 
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The dietary laws most likely emerged from various prohibitions of 
antiquity or from health considerations.31 These laws outline the rules 
of permitted and forbidden animals; prohibited parts of otherwise 
permitted animals; the manner of slaughtering and preparing permit-
ted animals; prohibited food mixtures; and proportions of food mix-
tures forbidden ab initio but permitted ex postfacto.32 
A The Laws of Kashruth 
1. Forbidden Foods33 
While persons adhering to kosher dietary laws are permitted to eat 
all vegetables, the rules prohibit the consumption of certain animals.34 
The Bible establishes specific rules regarding the consumption of 
animals.35 It permits any animal that "parteth the hoof and is com-
pletely cloven footed and cheweth the cud."36 If either of these two 
traits is lacking, the animal is forbidden.37 This rule, for example, 
excludes the pig from permissible animals because it has cloven feet, 
but does not chew the cud.38 The dietary laws also prohibit many types 
of birds.39 Only certain birds that have customarily been eaten, such 
as chicken, ducks, geese, pigeons, and turkeys, are deemed "clean" 
and thus may be eaten.40 Fish must have both fins and scales; there-
fore, all shellfish are prohibited.41 "Swarming things," such as insects, 
are forbidden as well.42 
2. Rules Regarding Permitted Foods 
The dietary laws place specific restrictions on the consumption of 
"clean" animals, those animals that the rules permit kosher followers 
31 LEO TREPP, JUDAISM: DEVELOPMENT AND LIFE 152 (1966). 
32 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 270-71 (1972). 
33 In addition to specific foods which are forbidden, the kosher dietary laws prohibit the 
following: animals that have died on their own; animals that have been torn by other animals; 
all blood; certain animal fat and sinews; animals not slaughtered by a Shohet, a man trained in 
Jewish law; animals found diseased; and certain foods in combination. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 38-{j3. 
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to eat.43 The rules forbid the consumption of certain portions of "clean" 
animals. For example, before any animal other than a bird can be 
prepared for consumption, the sciatic nerve must be removed.44 Also, 
the rules forbid the consumption of the fat portions attached to the 
stomach and intestines of an animal. The rules require them to be 
removed by purging the organs to which they are attached.45 The 
rules further forbid kosher followers from eating the abdominal fat of 
oxen, sheep, or goats, unless it is covered by flesh.46 
Furthermore, the rules prohibit the consumption of an animal that 
dies a natural death or that has been killed by any method other than 
by a Shohet.47 Similarly, the dietary laws forbid the consumption of an 
animal that has been lacerated by a wild beast or that is suffering 
from an injury which may lead to its death.48 
3. The Method of Slaughter 
Any animal that is not slaughtered according to a method sanc-
tioned by Jewish law is unfit for consumption.49 The person charged 
with slaughtering animals according to the Jewish dietary laws is 
called a Slwhet.50 The Slwhet is trained in Jewish law.51 If an animal was 
not slaughtered by a Shohet, kosher followers may not eat the animal. 52 
The Slwhet uses an extremely sharp knife to cut the animal's throat 
severing the arteries, veins, and windpipe in one continuous stroke.53 
In this way, blood drains so quickly from the brain that the animal 
feels no pain.54 Not only does the rapid drainage of blood make the 
meat more suitable for preservation, but physiological research has 
shown that the Jewish slaughtering method is the most humane.55 
After the Slwhet slaughters the animal, he inspects it for disease.56 
Any animal which is damaged by disease may not be consumed.57 
43 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 26, at 32. See ThEPP, supra note 31, at 153. 
44 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 26, at 39. 
4D Id. 
46 Id. 
47Id. See ThEPP, supra note 31, at 153-54. A Shohet is a man trained in the Jewish dietary 
laws. See id. at 154. 
4B ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 26, at 39. 
49 See ThEPP, supra note 31, at 154. 
WId. 
51Id. 
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4. Forbidden Food Mixtures 
The kosher dietary laws forbid certain otherwise permissible foods 
to be eaten in combination.58 The dietary laws outline three prohibi-
tions regarding mixtures of meat and milk products.59 The rules forbid 
the consumption of meat and milk products together; they forbid 
cooking them together; and they forbid mixing them together in any 
manner.60 Therefore, persons who adhere to the kosher dietary laws 
may not eat foods such as butter and milk with meat.61 There is also 
a temporal element to this prohibition. After a kosher follower eats 
meat, he or she must wait several hours before consuming any milk 
products, or vice versa.62 
B. Consumers of Kosher Food 
Jews are not the only consumers of kosher food.63 In fact, fewer than 
25% of those who purchase kosher food are J ewish.64 Recent data 
indicate that 500,000 families in the United States eat kosher.65 This 
figure includes both observant Jews66 who eat kosher in order to 
comply with their religion, and non-Jews.67 A growing number of 
non-Jewish consumers seek out kosher food for diverse reasons.68 
These consumers include Seventh-Day Adventists69 and Moslems who 
buy specific kosher foods to comply with their religious mandates.7o 
Persons with health problems such as allergies to milk products or 
shellfish also purchase kosher food. These people rely on the kosher 
seal which symbolizes that the kosher purveyor has followed the usual 
bases of kosher designation.71 




61Id. at 155. 
62 See id. 
63 See Suzanne Riss, Court Hears Beef Against State Kosher Rules, 128 N.J. L.J. 155 (1991); 
Joe M. Regenstein and Carrie E. Regenstein, The Kosher Dietary Laws and Their Implemen-
tation in the Food Industry, 42 FOOD TECHNOLOGY, June 1988, at 86. 
64 See Riss, supra note 63, at 155. 
66 Regenstein & Regenstein, supra note 63, at 86. 
66 Observant Jews refers to Orthodox Jews, Conservative Jews, and Reform Jews who have 
adopted guidelines for modern American kosher homes. See id. 
67Id. 
68 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., 579 A.2d at 324. 
69 Regenstein & Regenstein, supra note 63, at 86. 
70 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., 579 A.2d at 324. 
71 Id. 
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ucts. These people include animal lovers who believe kosher slaugh-
tering is more humane; vegetarians who buy kosher dairy products;72 
and people who believe that kosher processes of food preparation are 
under closer scrutiny and are thus likely to be cleaner and healthier.73 
C. The Notion of a "Kosher Ecology''74 
Jews observe kosher dietary laws because of their religious beliefs 
and not because the laws are scientifically correct.75 Jews avoid eating 
pork because the Scriptures prohibit it, not because they fear trichi-
nosis. Likewise, they refrain from eating milk and meat together 
because it is a forbidden combination according to dietary law and not 
because they know that a bacteria, coated by milk during digestion, 
may make them sick.76 Nevertheless, kashruth is significant not 
merely for religious reasons but also for "scientific" ones.77 While the 
hygienic practices behind kosher food are followed by Jews primarily 
as a matter of faith, these dietary laws also have ecological value.78 
The Jewish dietary laws are "natural" in that they conform to the 
scientific laws of the food chain.79 They discourage short-term exploi-
tation of natural resources and encourage long-term restraint.80 Fur-
thermore, the kosher rules regarding the slaughtering of animals 
have an ecological effect on people: they "reinforce sensitivity to the 
suffering of other creatures; more importantly, they do not reinforce 
brutalization."81 
Among those animals prohibited by the kosher dietary laws,82 car-
nivores predominate.83 The only mammals permitted for consumption 
are plant-eaters.84 Professor Newtol Press85 explains that humans 
have domesticated primarily herbivorous mammals as sources of 
72 Frances Ann Burns, ACLU, Jewish Graups, Clash Over Kosher Food Regulatiau, UPI, 
July 6, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. 
73 See id.; Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., 579 A.2d at 324. 
74 See generally Newtol Press, Kosher Ecology, 79 COMMENTARY 54 (1985). 
75Id. 
76Id. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. at 56-58. 
80 See id. at 58. 
81 See id. at 54. 
82 The following animals are prohibited by the Kosher dietary laws: the pig; the rabbit; birds 
of prey; all shellfish; eel and sturgeon; mice; crocodiles; and most insects. See TREPP, supra note 
31, at 153. 
83 See Press, supra note 74, at 56. 
84 Id. at 54, 56. 
85 N ewtol Press is a professor of biology at the University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee). 
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meat.86 In contrast, they have not domesticated dogs, cats, or bears 
as sources of meat, although they could have done SO.87 The reason is 
ecological; indeed, it makes "ecological sense" for humans to consume 
herbivores.88 Carnivores are fewer in number than herbivores,89 and 
hence, many more herbivores can be raised for consumption.90 
Because animals cannot digest cellulose, plants will always abound 
on our planet.91 In this way, the laws of nature protect plant eaters.92 
In contrast, there is no such protection for carnivorous animals.93 
Consuming carnivores for food would likely increase the risk of dimin-
ishing their numbers below the critical sustainable level at which an 
animal population can sustain itself.94 Thus, the Jewish dietary laws' 
prohibitions against eating carnivores makes sense ecologically: by 
prohibiting the consumption of carnivores, the dietary laws aid in 
preserving a ''balance'' among animal populations.95 
III. KOSHER FOOD LEGISLATION 
A. Origins 
A Hungarian Jewish immigrant to the United States wrote a letter 
to his rabbi in Hungary in 1887 recounting the disorderly state of the 
kosher food industry in the United States.96 In the late nineteenth 
century, many profiteers and charlatans were passing off non-kosher 
food as kosher. Since most Jewish immigrants were completely unfa-
miliar with their local surroundings, these "kosher crooks" were able 
to successfully deceive their customers.97 Early on, states such as New 
York and Massachusetts made efforts to eliminate this disorder by 
appointing a "Chief Rabbi."98 These efforts proved wholly unsatisfac-
tory, however, because the kosher food industry mounted unrelenting 
86 See Press, supra note 74, at 56. 
871d. 
881d. at 58. 







96 See generally MOSES WEINBERGER, JEWS AND JUDAISM IN NEW YORK, app. at 115-26 
(Jonathan D. Sarna ed. & trans., Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc. 1982) (1887). References 
that follow are to the reprinted English version. 
971d. 
98 Stern, supra note 13, at 390. 
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opposition to any such supervision of the industry.99 In an effort to 
remedy this chaos and thereby protect consumers of kosher food 
products, many of the states enacted legislation to prevent fraudulent 
or deceptive slaughtering, distribution, or sale of foods designated 
kosher, primarily meat and poultry.1°O 
The purpose behind kosher food laws was primarily consumer pro-
tection.101 By its label, a kosher food item invited the consumer's trust 
and reliance. Consumers of kosher products trusted that kosher pur-
veyors supplied strictly kosher products.102 These customers trusted 
that food labeled "kosher" had been prepared according to the Jewish 
dietary laws. Because most consumers could not determine whether 
food labeled "kosher" was in fact prepared under kosher standards, 
unscrupulous purveyors could reap substantial profits by misleading 
consumers into believing that their products were kosher.103 There-
fore, kosher food regulations served to protect consumers who pur-
chased kosher products for various reasons, relying on the fact that 
the products were indeed kosher.104 
New York enacted the first kosher food law in 1881.105 Massachu-
setts passed similar legislation one year laterYx; In 1922, the New York 
Legislature amended their kosher food law in order to make it more 
comprehensi ve.107 
The New York kosher food statute served as the model for all 
subsequent kosher food legislation.IOB Little is known about the spe-
99 See id. at 389; 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 221, 222 (1971). 
100 The states which have enacted kosher food laws include the following: Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, 
and Wisconsin. See Elazar & Goldstein, The Legal Status a/the American Jewish Community, 
73 AM. JEWISH Y.B. 3, 35 n.13 (1972). 
101 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State of New Jersey, 579 A.2d 316, 323 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1990). 
102 See 1. KLEIN, A GUIDE TO JEWISH PRACTICE 348 (1979). 
103Id. 
104 See Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., 579 A.2d at 323. 
105 Elazar & Goldstein, supra note 100, at 35. 
106Id. 
107Id. Most other Eastern and Midwestern statutes that now have kosher food statutes 
enacted them during the 1920's, with California adopting its kosher food law in 1931. The last 
surge of kosher food legislation occurred after the Second World War. Arkansas passed its law 
in 1949, Virginia in 1950, Arizona in 1951, and Kentucky in 1956. In 1966, New Jersey substan-
tially altered its kosher food statute in order to strengthen its enforcement provisions. See id. 
108 The New York law, as it applies today, forbids the fraudulent sale of food being represented 
as kosher when it is not. It also requires stores which sell both kosher and nonkosher products 
to clearly post that fact so that customers will not be misled into believing that all the food is 
kosher. A purveyor violating the statute is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by either a fine 
210 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:201 
cific origins of the original New York kosher food statute.109 Informa-
tion is available, however, for the reenactment of the New York leg-
islation in 1922.11° The reinforced statute of 1922 was supported by 
various Orthodox and Conservative Jewish groups, notably the New 
York division of the United Synagogue of America, the Union of 
Orthodox Rabbis, and the Assembly of Orthodox Rabbis.l11 These 
Jewish groups believed that a stronger law was necessary to protect 
the Jewish consumer observing kashruth from deceptive vendors 
engaged in the fraudulent practices of slaughter, distribution, and sale 
of food designated as kosher.112 The president of the New York divi-
sion of the United Synagogue of America expressed his concern to 
the governor of New York for the hundreds of thousands of Jewish 
residents in greater New York who observed the dietary laws that 
required the products they purchased to be kosher.113 The president 
wished to crack down on the problem of unscrupulous dealers who 
had been practicing deception on these people by keeping both kosher 
and non-kosher products, and by representing non-kosher products 
as kosher.l14 
While certain Jewish organizations supported the 1922 Kosher 
Food Statute, the Progressive Hebrew Butchers Protective Associa-
tion of New York vigorously opposed it. They opposed the statute 
because it defined "kosher" as food prepared according to Orthodox 
Hebrew religious requirements only.1l5 These groups opposed equat-
ing "kosher" with "Orthodoxy."116 
Opponents of California's kosher food statute of 1931 looked to the 
problems prevalent within the New York kosher food industry in an 
effort to prevent the statute's adoption. ll7 A letter written to a Cali-
fornia State Senator from the president of a (Reform) First Hebrew 
Congregation depicts one Jewish group's resistance to the statute.llS 
The president of this Congregation opposed the bill because he felt 
or short jail term, or both. Large purveyors of kosher meat can be guilty of a felony. The word 
"kosher" is described as food conforming to the Orthodox Hebrew religious requirements. See 
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 201(a) (McKinney 1991). 




113 [d. at n.14. 
114 [d. 
115 [d. at 36. 
116 [d. 
117 [d. 
118 [d. at 36--'J7. 
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that the state should stay out of Judaism's internal affairsY9 He 
explained that New York state had a similar kosher food law, yet it 
did not prevent the scandal within the kosher food industry in New 
York City. He urged the Senator to prevent the legislation, saying 
that if Judaism did not have enough inner resources to meet the 
present conditions, Judaism should pass away as soon as possible.l20 
The legislative history of California's kosher food law provides no 
record of its proponents.121 Despite the conflict, the California legisla-
ture ultimately enacted the kosher food statute in 1931.122 
B. Enforcement of Kosher Food Legislation 
The extent of enforcement and agency responsibility for enforcing 
kosher food laws differs among the states.l23 In nine states, state 
officials, either alone or together with local officials, are responsible 
for enforcement.l24 In the other states, enforcement of kosher food 
statutes rests with local prosecuting attorneys or local boards of 
health.125 
Only a small number of prosecutions have been brought under the 
kosher food laws.126 This could indicate two things. First, it could 
indicate that the statutes are ineffectual.l27 Particularly in states 
where the major state officials enforce the kosher food laws, the 
statutes may have minimal effect because state budgets fail to allocate 
funds specifically for kosher food law enforcement. 128 Second, the very 
few prosecutions brought under the kosher food statutes could indi-
cate that the statutes serve a deterrent function and reduce the 
necessity of prosecution.129 Indeed, the mere existence of kosher food 
legislation might act as a deterrent to fraudulent kosher purveyors 
119Id. at 37. 
120ld. 
121 I d. at 36. 
1221d. 
1231d. at 37. Responsible agencies generally include the state agricultural department, the 
state department of public health, or a designated segment of the state attorney general's office. 
See id. at 37-38. 
1241d. at 37. These states include: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. ld. at 37-38. 
1251d. at 37-38. In Pennsylvania, Arizona, Kentucky, Illinois, Virginia, Michigan, and Mary-
land, local prosecuting attorneys are responsible for enforcement. In Massachusetts, Ohio, and 
the District of Columbia, local boards of health enforce the statutes. 
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who fear the personal and economic ramifications of an investigation, 
not to mention a prosecution.l30 Hence, the threat of being investi-
gated and/or prosecuted may correct violative conduct.13l 
Another possible reason why few prosecutions have been brought 
under kosher food statutes may be due to the fact that actions have 
become confusing because of the interpretation of the term "kosher." 
There is a wide divergence of opinion as to the meaning of "kosher" 
among the different factions of the Jewish community.l32 
Of all the prosecutions under kosher food laws, most occurred in 
New York and California.l33 New York, for example, has an average 
of six civil penalties per month for such violations.134 The significant 
number of prosecutions in these states as compared to all other states 
may be explained by the fact that these two states together account 
for more than half the Jewish population in the United States.l35 
Prosecutions under the kosher food laws have historically led to 
litigation challenging the validity of kosher food laws on constitutional 
grounds.136 Before examining the history of cases which have inter-
preted kosher food laws, it is important to understand the Religion 
Clauses of the First Amendment. Much litigation questioning the 
validity of kosher food laws has focused on whether kosher food laws 
violate the Establishment Clause and/or the Free Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment.137 The next section provides an overview of 
these two clauses. 
IV. THE RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The first sixteen words in the Bill of Rights provide that "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof."I38 
The Establishment Clause prevents government from advancing, 
promoting, or endorsing religion.l39 The Free Exercise Clause pre-
vents government from unduly burdening the exercise of religion.140 
100 See id. 
131 See id. 
132 [d. at 40. 
133 [d. at 38. 
134 [d. 
135 [d. 
136 See, e.g., Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., 579 A.2d 316, 318-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1990); Sossin Systems, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 262 So. 2d 28, 29. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) 
137 See, e.g., Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., 579 A.2d at 319; Sossin, 262 So. 2d at 29-30. 
138 U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
139 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
140 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) 
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When taken together, the Religion Clauses are intended to ensure 
that government remains "benevolently neutral" toward religion.141 
A. The Establishment Clause 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that: "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of 
religion .... " 142 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
prohibits congressional action respecting an establishment of relig-
ion.143 In 1947, the Supreme Court unanimously supported incorpora-
tion of the Establishment Clause into the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, thereby extending Establishment Clause 
restrictions to state as well as federal governmental actions.144 In 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Area, the Supreme 
Court explained what the Establishment Clause means: 
it means that government may not promote or affiliate itself with 
any religious doctrine or organization, may not discriminate 
among persons on the basis of their religious beliefs and practices, 
may not delegate a governmental power to a religious institution, 
and may not involve itself too deeply in such an institution's 
affairs.l45 
The United States Supreme Court provided an extensive discus-
sion of the latitude of the Establishment Clause in Everson v. Board 
of Education. l46 The Establishment Clause prohibits a state and the 
federal government from setting up a church.147 Also, neither a state 
nor the federal government can pass legislation helping one religion, 
helping all religions, or preferring one religion over another.l48 Neither 
government can influence a person to go to or remain away from 
church against that person's will or compel him or her to avow belief 
or disbelief in any religion.149 Neither government can punish a person 
for church attendance or nonattendance.1OO Furthermore, neither a 
state nor the federal government can levy a tax to support any relig-
141 Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). 
142 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
143 [d. 
144 See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). 
145 492 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1989). 
146 330 U.S. at 15-16. 
147 [d. at 15. 
148 [d. 
149 [d. 
150 [d. at 15-16. 
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ious activities or institutions, and neither government can involve 
itself in the matters of any religious organization or group.l5l 
The Establishment Clause is designed to prevent certain evils.152 
These evils include: 
discriminating among religions or between religion and non-relig-
ion, symbolic union between government and a given religious 
faith or religion in general, sponsorship of the religious mission of 
a group, excessive entanglement between government and relig-
ion, and political divisiveness incited by the government's favor-
itism of a particular religious faith. 153 
It is important to distinguish between governmental actions which 
establish religion and those which accommodate persons who are 
practicing their religion.l54 The Court clarified this distinction in Jones 
v. Butz, where the Court upheld the exception for kosher slaughtering 
from the general requirements of the Humane Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 1901 et. seq.155 Of course, legislation which establishes religion is 
invalidYJ6 However, the Court has found that legislation which merely 
accommodates those who are practicing their religion is valid.157 For 
example, in Zorach v. Clauson, the Supreme Court upheld aNew 
York "released time" statute permitting public schools to release 
students to go to religious centers for religious education or devo-
tional exercises.l58 Justice Douglas noted in Zorach that church and 
151 [d. at 16. 
152 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
153 See id. at 612-15, 623. See also School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 
373, 390, 392-97 (1985) 
154 See Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., 579 A.2d 316, 326 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). 
166Jones v. Butz, 374 F. Supp. 1284, 1292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 419 U.S. 806 (1974). The 
statutory provisions of the Humane Slaughter Act which were involved in Butz are as follows: 
7 U.S.C. § 1902(b) (1988), which provides "No method of slaughtering or handling in connection 
with slaughtering shall be deemed to comply with the public policy of the United States unless 
it is humane. Either of the two following methods of slaughtering and handling are hereby found 
to be humane: ... by slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith 
or any other religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers 
loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the simultaneous and instantaneous 
severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument and handling in connection with such 
slaughtering." Section 1905 which related to establishment, composition, functions, compensa-
tion, meetings, and reports of advisory meetings has been repealed. See Pub. L. 95-445, § 5(b), 
Oct. 10, 1978, 92 Stat. 863. Section 1906 provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to 
prohibit, abridge, or in any way hinder the religious freedom of any person or group. N otwith-
standing any other provision of this chapter, in order to protect freedom of religion, ritual 
slaughter and the handling or other preparation of livestock for ritual slaughter are exempted 
from the terms of this chapter. For the purposes of this section the term 'ritual slaughter' means 
slaughter in accordance with section 1902(b) of this title." 
166 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
167 See, e.g., Butz, 419 U.S. at 1292-93; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1952). 
158 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312. 
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state need not be "aliens" to each other, but only that they should not 
be dependent on each other.159 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Board 
of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens explained 
that government may accommodate religious groups to allow meet-
ings in schools, provided they are not a subterfuge for the estab-
lishment of any particular religion.160 
In order to determine whether legislation establishes religion, the 
Court applies a three-pronged test which was first fully developed in 
a 1971 education case, Lemon v. Kurtzman. 161 To avoid violating the 
Establishment Clause, the legislation must satisfy three elements 
under the Lemon test. First, the legislation must have a secular 
purpose.162 This does not mean, however, that the law's purpose must 
be totally unrelated to religion.163 Rather, it means that when the 
entire motivation behind the legislation is the endorsement or disap-
proval of religion, such legislation will fail the first prong of the Lemon 
test. 164 
Second, the legislation's principal or primary effect must neither 
advance nor inhibit religion.l65 For legislation to have "forbidden 'ef-
fects'" under the Lemon test, the government must have advanced 
(or inhibited) religion through its own acts and influence.l66 Govern-
ment practices which engender identification of the government with 
religion violate the "effects" prong of the Lemon test, since such 
practices will advance at least one religion and will often inhibit other 
religions as well.167 
Third, the legislation must not foster excessive entanglement of 
government in religious matters.168 Determining what is "excessive" 
is not an easy task. The Court must examine the particular facts of 
159 [d. 
160 See Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 239--41 
(1990). 
161 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
162 [d. at 612. 
163 Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987). See also Zorach, 343 
U.S. at 314. 
164 See Wallace v. J affree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (overturning Alabama's period of silence 
because the legislative history demonstrated that there was no secular purpose and that it was 
intended to return prayer to the classroom). See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) 
(upholding the city of Pawtuckett, Rhode Island's inclusion of a creche in its annual Christmas 
display because, viewing the display as a whole, Court found a legitimate secular purpose-i.e., 
the celebration of a congressionally recognized holiday and national tradition and the depiction 
of the origins of that holiday). 
165 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
166 See Amos, 483 U.S. at 337. 
167 See Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., 608 A.2d at 1364. See also School District of the City 
of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. at 389. 
168 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. 
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each case to decide whether the third prong of the Lemon test has 
been satisfied.169 The Court has held that legislation which vests gov-
ernmental powers in a religious body constitutes "excessive" entan-
glement.17o For example, in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, the Court found 
a zoning statute, which vested in the governing bodies of churches 
and schools the power to effectively veto applications for liquor li-
censes within a five hundred foot radius of the church or school, 
violative of the Establishment Clause.l7l The Court invalidated the 
statute, reasoning that government may not delegate its decision-
making function to a religious body.1'72 The Court noted that the stat-
ute served to substitute the unilateral and absolute power of a church 
for the reasoned decision-making of a public legislative body.173 This 
entangling of religious authorities with governmental powers was 
just the sort of excessive entanglement prohibited by the third prong 
of the Lemon test.174 
B. The Free Exercise Clause 
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from burdening or 
inhibiting the exercise of religion.175 The Free Exercise Clause flatly 
forbids the outlawing of any religious belief. However, it does not 
absolutely prohibit governmental regulation of conduct that is related 
to religious belief.176 Indeed, the Court has rejected challenges under 
the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt 
acts prompted by religious beliefs, reasoning that even when the 
conduct is in accord with a person's religious beliefs, it is not entirely 
free from governmental restrictions.177 Nevertheless, in Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, an action involving fund solicitation by a Jehovah's Wit-
ness, the Court ruled that acts which are related to religious beliefs 
were within the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.178 The Court 
169 Accard Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 766 (1976). 
170 Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982). See Spacco v. Bridgewater School Dept., 
722 F. Supp. 834, 844 (D. Mass. 1989). 
171 Larkin, 459 U.S. at 117, 127. 
172 See id. at 127. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. See also Spacco, 722 F. Supp. at 844, 847 (lease which gave lessor-church power to 
influence elementary school curriculum in space leased from its parish center constituted an 
impermissible delegation to Roman Catholic Church of town's responsibility to determine what 
is taught to its elementary school students). 
175 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972). 
176 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). 
177 See id. at 303-04, 306; Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961). 
173 Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04, 307. 
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found that the freedom to act under the Free Exercise Clause, al-
though not absolute like the freedom to believe, could only be regu-
lated without undue infringement of the freedom to believe.l79 
The modern approach to free exercise jurisprudence commenced in 
1963 in Sherbert v. Verner. 180 In this case, Adell Sherbert, a Seventh-
Day Adventist, was fired for refusing to work on Saturdays, her 
religion's day of rest.181 She failed to obtain other employment because 
of her unwillingness to work on Saturdays, and she filed a claim for 
unemployment compensation benefits with South Carolina.182 South 
Carolina denied her claim for unemployment compensation because 
she had refused "suitable work when offered."183 The Supreme Court 
held that the state's denial violated Mrs. Sherbert's right to the free 
exercise of her religion.l84 The Court ruled that the state did not have 
a compelling interest in the eligibility provisions of its unemployment 
compensation statute sufficient to justify a denial of benefits to Mrs. 
Sherbert who would have been forced to choose between receiving 
benefits and following her religion.l85 
Strict scrutiny was also applied in Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the 
Court invalidated Wisconsin's refusal to exempt fourteen-and fifteen-
year old Amish students from the requirements of attending school 
until the age of 16.186 The parents of the Amish students objected to 
sending their children to school past the eighth grade.187 The parents 
satisfied the Court that it was an essential element of the Amish 
religion that members be informally taught to earn a livelihood 
through farming and other rural activities, and that compulsory high 
school education conflicted with that belief.188 The Court ruled that 
Wisconsin's interest in compulsory education was not compelling 
enough to trump a religiously based claim that the Amish religion 
forbade formal education past the eighth grade.l89 
The Court's application of strict scrutiny in free exercise cases 
continued until a 1990 case, Employment Division v. Smith. l90 In this 
179 [d. at 304. 
180 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
181 [d. at 399. 
182 [d. at 399-400. 
183 [d. at 40~1. 
184 [d. at 403. 
185 [d. at 406-09. 
186 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207-08, 234 (1972). 
187 [d. at 207. 
188 See id. at 210-11, 217, 235-S6. 
189 [d. at 235-36. 
190 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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case, the plaintiffs, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, were two drug 
rehabilitation counselors from Oregon.191 As members of the Native 
American Church, they ingested the hallucinogenic drug peyote as a 
sacramental substance in their worship services.192 As a result of their 
ingestation of peyote, they were fired.1OO When Oregon denied their 
unemployment compensations claims, they sued.l94 Not only did the 
U. S. Supreme Court rule against Smith and Black on the merits of 
the case (that their firing was justified and that Oregon could consti-
tutionally deny them benefits), but the Court also held that no balanc-
ing of the state's interest in its denial of benefits against the burden 
on the individual's religious beliefs needed to be carried out.l95 So long 
as the ban on peyote was generally applicable and not motivated by 
a governmental desire to promote or restrict religious beliefs, the 
Court found that the law was fully enforceable despite the burden on 
the plaintiffs' free exercise rights.l96 
Thus, in Smith, the Court abandoned the compelling interest doc-
trine.l97 The decision in Smith probably means that any generally 
applicable regulation will be enforceable and upheld even if it severely 
burdens individuals' free exercise rights. l98 Conceding that their hold-
ing in Smith would detrimentally affect minority religious practice, 
the Court explained that this was merely an "unavoidable conse-
quence of democratic government."I99 The decision clearly illustrates 
a trend on the Court's part to curtail Free Exercise rights.200 
V. HISTORY OF CASES INTERPRETING KOSHER FOOD LAWS 
Since their inception, there have been several constitutional chal-
lenges to kosher food laws on vagueness, due process, equal protec-
tion and first amendment grounds. Most litigation questioning the 
validity of kosher food regulations occurred in New York. 




196 See id. at 8~-85, 890. 
196 See id. at 879, 890. 
1\17 See id. at 888-89. 
100 See id. at 879. 
199 Id. at 890. 
200 See J. Brent Walker, Free Exercise of Religion: A Right Not a Luxury, 66 FLA. B. J. 22, 
24-26 (1992). 
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A. Litigation Concerning New York State's Kosher Food Statute 
1. Litigation in State Courts 
In New York, litigation concerning the enactment and constitution-
ality of ordinances or statutes prohibiting the passing off of non-ko-
sher food products as kosher began soon after the passage of its 
kosher food law.201 In 1916, two kosher butchers, charged with violat-
ing New York's kosher food statute,202 brought suit to challenge the 
statute's validity in People v. Goldberger.203 The statute provided that 
"a person who, with intent to defraud, sells or exposes for sale any 
meat, and falsely represents it to be kosher ... is guilty of a misde-
meanor."204 The court upheld the statute against a variety of constitu-
tional challenges.205 
The butchers argued that the statute was meaningless, "impossible 
of interpretation," and hence, void.206 They insisted that the term 
"kosher" was a foreign word; that its use as an essential element of 
kosher food legislation rendered the law invalid. They also argued 
that the law as enacted assumed a knowledge in those addressed of 
the entire history, law, and literature of the Hebrew race. Further-
more, they contended that the wording of the legislation was so 
strange and difficult for the community to interpret, that the courts 
should declare it void.207 
The court dismissed these arguments, saying that the word "ko-
sher" must be recognized as an English word; but, regardless of 
whether it was recognized as English or foreign, it was still within 
the Legislature's power to deal with the subject-matter.208 The court 
reasoned that the legislature's power extended to using the term that 
described the subject in question, even if that word was foreign.209 
The court also rejected the contention that the law was a private 
or local bill, creating a special privilege or immunity.210 Instead, the 
court found that the statute was a general regulation which applied 
201 Stern, supra note 13, at 391. 
202 At the time of this case, New York's kosher food statute was designated as section 435 of 
the Penal Law of New York. Today it is N.Y. AGRIC & MKTS. LAW § 201-a et. seq. (McKinney 
1991). 
203 People v. Goldberger, 163 N.Y.S. 663 (1916). 
204 [d. at 664. 





210 [d. at 666. 
220 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:201 
to all inhabitants of the state who might at any time be included 
within the class to which its provisions applied, and stated that a 
statute was not private or local because it might affect only a limited 
class.211 
The butchers also contended that the statute was an invasion of 
religious liberty or personal rights.212 The court dismissed this argu-
ment, holding that there was no invasion of religious freedom or 
personal rights.213 The statute was directed against an aspect of fraud. 
According to the Court, protection from fraud was not contrary to the 
constitutional provision which forbids the interference with the free 
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, but was 
rather in distinct accord with it.214 While the Legislature could not 
enact a religious creed, the Constitution protects men of all creeds in 
undisturbed enjoyment of religious freedom.215 The court found that 
such protection was the statute's aim.216 
Thus, from the beginning, New York's kosher food law withstood 
constitutional attack. Interestingly, the butchers never appealed this 
decision and no Jewish organization intervened in this case.217 Two 
years later, in People v. Atlas, a different kosher butcher raised 
another constitutional challenge to the New York State kosher food 
statute.218 In this case, the butcher contended that the statute failed 
to sufficiently define the crime because the meaning of "kosher" in-
volved a consideration of the vast quantity of imprecise rabbinic law.219 
In effect, he argued that no one could discern in advance that a certain 
piece of meat was not kosher, and therefore, that its sale was illegal.220 
The court rejected this argument, stating that the legislature did not 
mean to use ''kosher'' in any indefinite sense, but rather in the ordi-
nary sense in which it was used in the trade-i.e., to designate meat 
as having been prepared under and sanctioned by the Orthodox re-
ligious requirements.221 
The butcher in Atlas also contended that the statute constituted 






216 [d.; Stern, supra note 13, at 391. 
217 Stern, supra note 13, at 391. 
218 People v. Atlas, 170 N.Y.S. 834, 835 (Sup. Ct. 1918) aff'd, 230 N.Y. 629 (1921) 
219 See id. 
200 See id. 
221 [d. 
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rejected this argument, reasoning that the benefits of the law were 
being conferred on both Jews and non-Jews alike.223 According to the 
court, although those principally interested in the subject-matter of 
the legislation might be Jewish, the benefits of the statute were not 
confined to them.224 Non-Jews might be interested in knowing that 
greater care and cleanliness had been observed in the selection and 
slaughter of the animals than is otherwise exercised by non-kosher 
butchers.225 
2. Litigation in Federal Courts 
In 1922, several kosher food processors challenged the New York 
State kosher food statute in federal courts as contravening the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution in Hy-
grade Provision Co., Inc. v. Sherman.226 The U. S. Supreme Court 
dismissed the argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague 
because of the indefinite nature of the word "kosher" and phrase 
"Orthodox Hebrew religious requirements."2Z7 The court, referring to 
the New York courts' construction of the statute in Atlas, found that 
the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. The court held that the 
statute would be violated only if the purveyor intentionally sold non-
kosher products as kosher.228 Since the statute required not only fal-
sity of representation, but also intent to defraud, the chance that 
there would be much rabbinic disagreement about a product posed no 
constitutional problems, even though the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment required that criminal statutes precisely 
define the conduct prohibited.229 Thus, to the Court, it seemed that 
whatever difficulty there might be in correctly determining whether 
a given product was kosher, appellants were unduly apprehensive 
since they were only required to exercise good faith judgment in 
order to avoid violating the statutes. Indeed, the court said that even 
without the statutes, kosher food processors would be bound to exer-
cise such good faith judgment based upon the ordinary principles of 
223 See id. at 836. 
224Id. 
225Id. 
226 Hygrade Provision Co., Inc. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925). The Federal District Court 
for the Southern District of New York rejected the food processors' claims without publishing 
any opinion, and the processors appealed to the United States Supreme Court. See Stern, supra 
note 13, at 391. 
227 Hygrade Provision Co., Inc., 266 U.S. at 501. 
228Id. 
229Id. at 501-02; Stern, supra note 13, at 392. 
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fair dealing. By dealing in the kosher food business, they in effect 
assert a good faith intent to distinguish between kosher and non-ko-
sher foods.230 
Furthermore, the Court held that the evidence warranted the con-
clusion that the word "kosher" had a meaning well-enough defined to 
allow one who was engaged in the kosher food trade to apply it 
correctly.231 Finally, the court found that the statute did not violate 
the Commerce Clause because it was not aimed at interstate com-
merce; did not impose a direct burden upon interstate commerce; did 
not discriminate against it; was fairly within the police powers of the 
state; bore a reasonable relation to the legitimate purpose of the 
enactment; and did not conflict with any congressional legislation.232 
No Establishment Clause challenge was made in Hygrade. This is 
probably because at the time this case was decided, the First Amend-
ment's Establishment Clause233 was thought not to apply to state 
laws.234 
B. Challenges to Kosher Food Laws in Other States 
Other states enacted kosher food laws patterned after the New 
York statute. Non-Orthodox groups opposed many of these enact-
ments; however, the groups' resistance was ineffectual.235 It was not 
until 1961, thirty-six years after the Hygrade decision, that opponents 
of the kosher food laws raised another challenge to the constitution-
ality of these kosher food statutes.236 The challenges to the California's 
kosher food statute in Ehrlich v. Municipal Court of Beverly Hills 
Judicial District were similar to those that had been raised against 
the New York kosher food law.237 
The court upheld the California statute238 making it a misdemeanor 
to sell or expose for sale, with intent to defraud, any meat falsely 
represented to be kosher, or to be a product sanctioned by Orthodox 
Hebrew religious requirements against an attack that it was void for 
230 Hygrade Provision Co. Inc., 266 U.S. at 501-02; Stern, supra note 13, at 392. 
231 Hygrade Provision Co., Inc., 266 U.S. at 502. 
232 [d. at 503. 
233 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states in relevant part that "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an Establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
234 Stern, supra note 13, at 392. 
235 [d. at 393. 
236 Ehrlich v. Municipal Court of Beverly Hills Jud. Dist., 360 P.2d 334 (1961); See Stern, supra 
note 13, at 393. 
237 360 P.2d at 335. 
238 The California kosher food statute is designated as section 383b of the Penal Code. The 
relevant portions of § 383b of the Penal Code read as follows: 
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vagueness.239 The statute defined "kosher" to mean a strict compliance 
with every Jewish law and custom.240 The defendant contended that 
the law was so vague and uncertain that it was unenforceable because 
no two rabbis could agree on the meaning of the term "kosher."241 The 
Ehrlich court, however, found that the statute was similar to the New 
York law. Relying on decisions in that state, such as Atlas and Hy-
grade, the court held that the California statute should be interpreted 
to apply only to intentional violations of the kosher food laws.242 Re-
ferring to the Supreme Court's decision in Hygrade, the Ehrlich court 
pointed out that the kosher food statute required specific intent to 
defraud.243 Therefore, the court held that the specificity required in 
describing prohibited acts is unnecessary where the statutory viola-
tion depends upon the existence of a specific wrongful intent. The 
court declared that even if the actions that a statute prohibits are 
defined in vague terms, the statute would be upheld so long as the 
law requires an adequately defined specific intent.244 
The Ehrlich court recognized, however, that the California law was 
different from the New York statute in one significant respect: the 
California statute defined food as kosher only if it was in "strict 
compliance with every Jewish law and custom."245 The court said that 
this language, which necessitated the adoption of "every possible 
halakhic compulsion,"246 introduced some level of uncertainty into the 
California law beyond that which was present in New York's stat-
Every person who with intent to defraud, sells or exposes for sale any meat or meat 
preparations, and falsely represents the same to be kosher, whether such meat or meat 
preparations be raw or prepared for human consumption, or as having been prepared 
under and from a product or products sanctioned by the orthodox Hebrew religious 
requirements ... is guilty of a misdemeanor .... The word 'kosher' is here defined to 
mean a strict compliance with every Jewish law and custom pertaining and relating to 
the killing of the animal or fowl from which the meat is taken or extracted, the dressing, 
treatment and preparation thereof for human consumption, and the manufacture, 
production, treatment and preparation of such other food or foods in connection with 
Jewish laws and customs, and to the use of tools, implements, vessels, utensils, dishes, 
and containers that are used in connection with the killing of such animals and fowls 
and the dressing, preparation, production, manufacture and treatment of such meats 
and other products, foods and foodstuffs. 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 383b (West 1988). 
239 Ehrlich, 360 P.2d at 337. 
240 [d. at 335. 
241 [d. 
242 [d. at 337; See Stern, supra note 13, at 393. 
243 Ehrlich, 360 P.2d at 337. 
244 Ehrlich, 360 P.2d at 337, (quoting People v. McCaughan, 317 P.2d 974, 977 (1957». 
245 [d. at 337. 
246 The term "halakhic" describes that part of Jewish teaching dealing with ritual and behav-
ior, Judaism's legal side. See UNTERMAN, supra note 24, at 235. 
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ute.247 Rather than finding the statute void for vagueness because of 
this language, the court declared that "mere surplusage" would not 
invalidate the statute because of the doctrine of severability.248 
Eleven years after Ehrlich, the corporate operator of a hotel in 
Miami Beach challenged the kosher food ordinance of Miami Beach in 
Sossin Systems, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach.249 The city fined the 
hotel operator for selling non-kosher-for-Passover cakes as kosher-
for-Passover.250 The municipal kosher food ordinance prohibited the 
fraudulent sale, by restaurants, of any food falsely represented to be 
kosher, and provided that the possession of non-kosher food on prem-
ises held out to be places where only kosher food was served, consti-
tuted prima facie evidence of intent to defraud.251 The defendant 
contended that the ordinance was an enactment affecting the estab-
lishment of religion by compelling, under threat of prosecution, com-
pliance with religious law.252 This case marked the first Establishment 
Clause challenge to a kosher food statute in 55 years. Even though 
this was a concrete Establishment Clause claim, the Florida court 
brushed it aside. The court refused to view the ordinance as a legis-
lative enactment establishing or respecting the establishment of re-
ligion, or as prohibiting the free exercise of religion. Instead, the 
Sossin court reasoned that the ordinance served to safeguard the 
observance of Judaism's tenets, and to prohibit conduct that improp-
erly interfered with it.2M The court stressed that enactments such as 
the ordinance involved in this case had been consistently recognized 
as valid.254 This was by no means a conclusive response to the Estab-
247 [d. See Stern, supra note 13, at 394. 
248 Ehrlich, 360 P.2d at 337. 
249 262 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). The kosher food ordinance of the City of Miami 
Beach is designated as section 16--{)0 of the Code of the City of Miami Beach. The pertinent 
sections of the municipal ordinance read as follows: 
A person who, with intent to defraud, sells or exposes for sale in any hotel, restaurant, 
or other place where food products are sold for consumption on the premises, any meat 
or meat preparation or any article of food or food preparation and falsely represents 
the same to be kosher, or as having been prepared in accordance with the orthodox 
Hebrew religious requirements ... shall upon conviction thereof be punished as pro-
vided in Section 1-8 of the City Code .... The possession of food, food products, 
beverages and merchandise, which, in fact, are not kosher in any premises wherein it 
is held out that only kosher food, food products, beverages and merchandise are dealt 
in therein shall be prima facie evidence that the person in possession of such premises 
exposes such food, food products, beverages and merchandise for sale with intent to 
defraud. MIAMI BEACH CODE § 16--50. 
250 Sossin Systems, Inc., 262 So. 2d at 29. 
251 [d. 
252 See id. 
2511 [d. at 30. 
254 [d. 
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lishment Clause challenge, and it did not prevent other such chal-
lenges to kosher food laws from being raised.255 
In a recent Maryland case, Barghout v. Mayor, a hot dog vendor 
was prosecuted under a Baltimore kosher food ordinance256 for selling 
hot dogs contaminated with non-kosher sausage grease as kosher.257 
The vendor was found guilty and fined $400 plus $100 in court costS.258 
The vendor sought a declaratory judgment from the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland that the ordinance violated 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Consti-
tution.259 The District Court judge certified two questions to the Court 
256 Stern, supra note 13, at 394. See Brach's Meat Market v. Abrams, 668 F. Supp. 275, 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). In this 1987 case, a New York butcher shop owner sought a declaratory 
judgment that the state law regulating kosher meat sales was unconstitutional. In a disagree-
ment involving the correct method of preparing tongue for sale to the kosher food market, the 
butcher shop owner, with support from his Orthodox rabbi, insisted that the tongues displayed 
in his shop were properly labeled kosher. The state inspector disagreed, complaining that the 
tongues were not kosher since the meat had not been "deveined" and contained major blood 
vessels. The inspector assessed a $5,800 fine against the butcher. In response, the butcher 
brought an action in federal court, contending that the New York kosher food law violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The court in this case avoided reaching the 
merits of the butcher's claims on technical grounds, stating that the plaintiff would have an 
adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims in state court. The butcher, however, 
never pursued his claim in the state courts. [d. at 276-81. 
256 The Baltimore kosher food ordinance is designated as Article 19, section 50 of the Baltimore 
City Code. The relevant portions of Article 19, § 50 of the Baltimore City Code read as follows: 
Any person, firm or corporation who, with intent to defraud, sells, exposes for sale, 
any meat or meat preparation, article of food or food products, and falsely represents 
the same to be Kosher, whether such meat or meat preparation, article of food or food 
product, be raw or prepared for human consumption, or as having been prepared under, 
and/or of a product or products sanctioned by the orthodox Hebrew religious rules and 
requirements or under the dietary laws either by direct or indirect statement, orally 
or in writing, which might reasonably be calculated to deceive or lead a reasonable man 
to believe that a representation is being made that such food, meat, meat preparations 
or food product is kosher or prepared in accordance with the orthodox Hebrew relig-
ious rules and requirements and/or dietary laws, or falsely represents any food prod-
ucts or food or the contents of any package or container to be so constituted and 
prepared, by having or permitting to be inscribed thereon the word "Kosher" in any 
language, is . . . guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than fifty 
dollars ($50.00) or more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment of not 
less than thirty (30) days or more than one (1) year, or both, at the discretion of the 
Court .... In order to comply with the provisions of this section persons dealing with 
either kosher meat, meat preparations, food and/or food products only, or persons 
dealing with both kosher and non-kosher meat, meat preparations, food and/or food 
products must adhere to and abide by the orthodox Hebrew religious rules and regu-
lations and the dietary laws; otherwise, he [sic] shall be in violation of this section. 
BALTIMORE CODE, art. 19, § 50. 
257 600 A.2d 841, 842 (Md. 1992). 
258 [d. at 843. 
259 [d. 
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of Appeals for resolution before reaching the federal constitutional 
c1aims.260 
The first question asked whether an individual could be convicted 
of violating the kosher food ordinance if he or she sincerely believed 
that his or her conduct conformed to the kosher requirements.261 The 
court answered this question in the negative, stating that the ordi-
nance was drafted to protect consumers from unscrupulous purveyors 
attempting to deceive them into purchasing something less than what 
they expected.262 For this reason, the court held that only those ven-
dors who intentionally deceived people by making false repre-
sentations violated the statute's proscriptions, while those who sin-
cerely believe that their food products met the kosher requirements 
were in compliance with the ordinance.263 
The second question asked whether the ordinance violated Article 
36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,264 which dealt with religious 
freedom. Again, the court answered in the negative.265 It first rea-
soned that the term "kosher" was not overly vague, so that even 
though a particular word in a statute embodied a complex concept, 
this did not render the statute void for vagueness.266 Next, the court 
ruled that the ordinance did not create a private denominational 
preference.267 Accordingly, the court held that nothing in Baltimore's 
200 [d. 
261 [d. at 841-42. 
262 [d. at 845. 
263 [d. 
264 Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is headed "Religious Freedom." It states 
as follows: 
[T]hat as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks most 
acceptable to Him, all persons are equally entitled to protection in their religious 
liberty; wherefore, no person ought by any law to be molested in his person or estate, 
on account of his religious persuasion, or profession, or for his religious practice, unless, 
under the color of religion, he shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, 
or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural, civil or religious 
rights; nor ought any person to be compelled to frequent, or maintain, or contribute, 
unless on contract, to maintain, any place of worship, or any ministry; nor shall any 
person, otherwise competent as a witness, juror, on account of his religious belief, 
provided, he believes in the existence of God, and that under his dispensation such 
person will be held morally accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished 
therefor either in this world or in the world to come. 
Nothing shall prohibit or require the making reference to belief in, reliance upon, or 
invoking the aid of God or a Supreme Being in any governmental or public document, 
proceeding, activity, ceremony, school, institution, or place. 
Nothing in this article shall constitute an establishment of religion. MD. CONST. CODE 
ANN. art. 36 (1981). 
265 Barghout v. Mayor, 600 A.2d at 849. 
266 [d. at 847. 
267 See id. at 848. 
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food ordinance inhibited the free exercise of religion guaranteed un-
der Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.268 The court 
found that rather than inhibiting religious freedom, the ordinance 
enhanced such freedom by protecting those individuals who desired 
to adhere to the Jewish dietary laws.269 
The court in Barghout never addressed the Establishment Clause 
claim.270 Reasoning that Article 36 of the Maryland's Declaration of 
Rights did not contain an establishment clause which would prohibit 
government from setting up a church, from giving preferential treat-
ment to any religion, or from coercing belief or disbelief in any relig-
ion, the court concluded that the final determination as to whether the 
ordinance violated the Establishment Clause lay with the federal 
COurtS.271 
C. The Ran-Dav Decision 
1. Background 
To date, the most serious challenge to the kosher food laws has been 
Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State of New Jersey.272 In this case, 
Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. and one of its principals, Arthur Weis-
man (together RDC), operated a kosher food business in Linden, New 
J ersey.273 As such, they were subject to regulatory supervision both 
privately through a religious rabbi, and civilly, by the State's Bureau 
of Kosher Enforcement.274 The Bureau of Kosher Enforcement was 
created within the Attorney General's Consumer Mfairs Division in 
order to enforce the kosher food regulations.275 The head of the Bu-
reau, an Orthodox Hebrew rabbi, oversaw several kosher food inspec-
268Id. at 849. 
269Id. at 848. 
:m Id. at 849. 
271Id. 
272 579 A.2d 316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). 
273Id. at 319. 
274Id. 
275Id. at 320. New Jersey's kosher food statute, N.J.S.A. 2a-I-8-B, was repealed in 1978 and 
replaced by administrative regulations. The relevant section of the New Jersey Kosher Food 
Regulations provides: 
It shall be an unlawful consumer practice for any person to sell, offer for sale, expose 
for sale, serve or have in his possession with intent to sell, by any of the following 
means, in any restaurant, hotel, store or catering facility or other place, any food or 
food product which is falsely represented to be Kosher, Kosher for Passover, under 
Rabbinical Supervision, pareve or as having been prepared under and/or with a prod-
uct sanctioned by Orthodox Jewish religious requirements .... N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
13, § 45a-21.2 (1987). 
228 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:201 
tors on his staff.276 The inspectors are not rabbis, and some are not 
even Jewish.277 
The New Jersey Attorney General also created a "State Kosher 
Advisory Committee" through an executive directive, consisting of 
ten members appointed by the Attorney General.278 The Committee 
is responsible for advising the Attorney General on kosher matters 
and enforcement of the New Jersey kosher regulations, and making 
recommendations for alterations in the regulatory scheme.279 
Inspectors employed by the Bureau of Kosher Enforcement cited 
Mr. Weisman, a kosher butcher, for violating the New Jersey kosher 
food regulations.280 Specifically, they charged him with possessing 
meat that had been neither soaked and salted, nor labeled as such. 
According to Mr. Weisman, the mislabeling was the result of error.281 
They also charged him with possessing calf tongues prepared in such 
a way that they were rendered unfit for sale as kosher.282 The kosher 
butcher denied any violation of the kosher dietary rules, refused to 
pay a fine, and ultimately filed suit, along with RDC, challenging the 
very concept of kosher food laws.283 
In this action, RDC attacked kosher food laws in several different 
ways. RDC contended that the kosher food regulations violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and the coordinate provision of the New Jersey Consti-
tution.284 According to RDC, so long as they were in compliance with 
the kosher standards set by their supervising rabbi, the State had no 
constitutional authority to set different standards to which RDC was 
required to conform.285 By describing kosher food as that which con-
forms to the "Orthodox Hebrew" requirements, RDC argued that the 




200 Id. at 318. See Stern, supra note 13, at 395. 
281 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, 579 A.2d at 321. See Stern, supra note 13, at 395. 
282 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, 579 A.2d at 321. See Stern, supra note 13, at 395. To be "fit," 
meat must be soaked and salted to remove blood before cooking. Meat which is not soaked or 
salted within three days of slaughtering may be eaten only if roasted over an open flame. 
Obviously, then, a kosher butcher must label meat as to whether it was salted, and, if not, when 
it was slaughtered. In short, meat which is more than three days old but not soaked and salted 
can be "kosher," but only if the consumer is advised of the restrictions on its use. Stern, supra 
note 13, at 395 n.19. 
283 Stern, supra note 13, at 395. See Brief for Appellant at 2, Ran-Dav's County Kosher, 579 
A.2d 316 (1990). 
284 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, 579 A.2d at 319. The establishment clause of the New Jersey 
Constitution states: "There shall be no establishment of one religious sect in preference to 
another. ... " N. J. CONST., art. I, par. 4 (1947). 
286 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, 579 A.2d at 319. 
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State had decreed a single standard of religious observance to the 
exclusion of all others.286 As a result, said RDC, "the State was liter-
ally establishing a religion, just as it would if it decreed that only the 
King James Bible could be sold as the Bible."287 RDC argued that the 
fact that an Orthodox Hebrew rabbi was the chief official of the 
Attorney General's Bureau of Kosher Enforcement exacerbated the 
problems.288 
RDC also contended that the state-adopted singular standard for 
kashruth was unconstitutionally vague. 289 According to RDC, state 
prosecutors or judges could not determine what is and is not kosher 
without having to decide religious questions that were beyond their 
competence.2OO For instance, the kosher butcher in Ran-Dav asserted 
that the charge against him was just one part of a long-running 
doctrinal conflict between RDC's certifying rabbi and the state's ko-
sher inspector and other Orthodox rabbis.291 
The state argued that the regulations had a valid secular purpose 
because they clearly prohibited the sale offood deceptively mislabeled 
as kosher.292 The state insisted that its only purpose in regulating the 
sale of kosher food was to protect consumers who pay higher prices 
for food labeled as kosher.293 The state contended that the regulations 
did not require anyone to participate in a religious ceremony or to 
perform any other religious ritual or to eat kosher food.294 According 
to the State, the New Jersey kosher food law required only that those 
who sought to profit from the sale of kosher foods sell exactly what 
they claimed to be selling.295 
In response to RDC's contention that the law's prescription of a 
singular standard of kashruth was overly vague, the State said that 
it was interpreting the phrase "prepared and maintained in strict 
compliance with the laws and customs of the Orthodox Jewish relig-
ion" as validating any bona fide belief by a purveyor that an item in 
question was in fact kosher.296 The state conceded that where Ortho-
286 [d. at 322. See Stern, supra note 13, at 395. 
287 Stern, supra note 13, at 395-96. 
288 [d. See Brief for Appellant at 42-43, Ran-Day's County Kosher, 579 A.2d 316 (N.J. 1990) 
(N o. A-5420-88T2). 
289 Stern, supra note 13, at 396. See Brief for Appellant at 37, Ran-Day's County Kosher (No. 
A-{)42~T2). 
290 Ran-Day's County Kosher, 579 A.2d at 322. 
291 Stern, supra note 13, at 396. 
292 Ran-Day's County Kosher, 579 A.2d at 319. 
293 [d. 
294 Stern, supra note 13, at 396. 
295 Ran-Day's County Kosher, 579 A.2d at 319. 
296 [d. 
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dox authorities disagreed, any legitimate interpretation of the stand-
ard practiced in the industry would be acceptable.297 Thus, under the 
State's purported interpretation, there would be no violation where 
there was a dispute among accepted Orthodox Jewish authorities and 
the seller had complied with either interpretation.298 The Assistant 
Attorney General argued that the regulation was a civil standard, not 
a religious standard, and that the purpose of the regulations was to 
promote truth in advertising.299 
The state also contended that the regulations did not establish a 
religion, as RDC maintained, but instead advanced the purpose for 
which the state legislature intended the law-i.e., to prevent decep-
tion and fraud in the sale and advertisement of Kosher products. 
According to the state, the regulations did not violate the constitu-
tional prohibitions against advancing the interest of one religion or 
religious group over another.30o 
2. Ruling at the Appellate Division Level 
The Appellate Court rejected RDC's constitutional challenge, find-
ing that the regulation's reference to kosher law was not impermissi-
bly vague and did not foster an excessive government entanglement 
with religion.30l Responding to RDC's argument that these regula-
tions violated the Establishment Clause, the Court stated that al-
though there were disputes as to whether certain foods may be ko-
sher, the issues in the State's enforcement proceeding against RDC 
did not entail doctrinal disputes regarding interpretations of Jewish 
law to determine what was kosher.302 Instead, the court ruled that 
what was involved was a claim by the State of fraud or mistake and 
denials by RDC.303 For example, the court said that if RDC knew that 
the chicken breasts were not kosher but were representing them to 
consumers as kosher, their actions would justify a claim of consumer 
fraud, irrespective of any divergent interpretations of "kosher."3M 
Since the State's specific claims did not implicate a challenge to the 
interpretation of "kosher" by RDC's supervising rabbi, RDC's consti-
tutional challenge was viewed as faciaP05 The court applied the three-
297 I d. at 323. 
298 See id. 
299 Riss, supra note 63, at 155. 
300 ld. 
301 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, 579 A.2d at 326-29. 
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prong test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman306 in order to determine 
whether the State's interpretation and application of "prepared and 
maintained in strict compliance with the laws and customs of the 
Orthodox Jewish religion" was constitutional.307 Under the Lemon 
test, a statute does not violate the Establishment Clause if (1) it has 
a secular legislative purpose, (2) its principal or primary effect is one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not foster 
an excessive government entanglement with religion.30s 
The Appellate Court held that, in light of the various health and 
religious reasons for buying kosher foods and the tremendous profit 
that could be made by palming off non-kosher food as kosher, it was 
clear that there was a secular legislative purpose behind the regula-
tions (viz. the protection against intentional and negligent misrepre-
sentation in the sale of kosher food).309 Thus, the regulations satisfied 
the first prong of the Lemon test.3IO The court also held that the 
regulations satisfied the second prong of the Lemon test, finding that 
the principal or primary effect was one that neither advanced nor 
inhibited religion.311 Finally, the court held that the regulations did not 
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion, satisfy-
ing the third prong.312 
The court explained that the regulations required no State inter-
pretation of Jewish law and that the State, in fact, determined only 
whether a purveyor had a good faith belief that an item it offered or 
intended to offer for sale met acknowledged kosher requirements.313 
Although RDC argued that the State entangles itself in religion when 
it looks to an undefined body of kosher dietary law which is not spelled 
out in the regulations, the court found that RDC failed to point out 
any dispute as to the interpretation of Jewish law.314 In any event, the 
court reasoned that because the kosher dietary laws were sufficiently 
definite, the regulations' reference to such laws were simply a short-
hand way of expressing a known entity.315 
One justice of the Appellate Division dissented, saying that, in his 
opinion, the kosher food regulations violated the Establishment 
306 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
307 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, 579 A.2d at 325, 329. 
308 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
309 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, 579 A.2d at 325. 
310 [d. 
311 [d. at 326. 
312 [d. at 326--27. 
313 [d. at 327. 
314 [d. at 328--29. 
315 [d. 
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Clause of the federal and state constitutions.316 According to Justice 
D' Annunzio, the requirements violated all three prongs of the Lemon 
test.317 He reasoned that despite the State's attempt to put a commer-
cial spin on the preparation and maintenance of kosher foods and 
thereby to justify state regulation of this "commerce," the kosher 
dietary laws were laws of religious ritual.318 To Justice D'Annunzio, 
the State's argument that the regulatory purpose was fraud preven-
tion was too simple, because practically every attempt by the State 
to regulate religious practice could be justified as a legitimate fraud-
preventing measure.319 Hence, consumer-protection legislation that 
prohibited a church from calling itself "Christian" unless it professed 
and taught the divinity of Jesus Christ would not satisfy the first 
prong of the Lemon test although its objective was the prevention of 
fraud.320 
Justice D'Annunzio also believed that the regulations violated 
Lemon's second prong because its primary effect was the advance-
ment of religion by raising the kosher dietary rules to legal status.321 
Finally, he felt that the third prong was not satisfied because the 
State's regulatory scheme involved conferring civil authority on cler-
gyman for the supervision and enforcement of religious observance 
and ritua}.322 
After a majority of the Appellate Division upheld the constitution-
ality of the kosher food regulations, RDC appealed to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court.323 
3. Ruling at the State Supreme Court Level 
The New Jersey Supreme Court held in a 4-3 decision that the 
regulations setting forth the standards for the preparation, mainte-
nance, and sale of kosher products violated the Establishment Clauses 
of both the federal and state constitutions.324 In so deciding, the court 
refrained from distinguishing between the two clauses. It reaffirmed 
316 [d. at 330 (D' Annunzio, J., dissenting). 
317 [d. 
318 [d. 




3~ Because Justice D' Annunzio did not dissent from the majority's rejection of the freedom 
of religion, due process, or vagueness claims, the only issue before the State Supreme Court as 
a matter of right was the Establishment Clause issue. See Brief for Respondent at 5, Ran-Dav's 
County Kosher, 608 A.2d 1353 (1992) (No. 32-;525). 
324 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State of New Jersey, 608 A.2d 1353, 1355 (N.J. 1992). 
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that New Jersey's Religion Clause, which does not denounce prohibi-
tions on the "free exercise" of religion, was less pervasive than the 
federal clause. Therefore, the court did not interpret it more broadly 
than the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution.325 
Applying the Lemon test to the regulations, the court ruled that 
the regulations were unconstitutional, primarily because they "fos-
tered an excessive government entanglement with religion."326 The 
court's holding was based upon many factors, including the fact that 
the regulations left state secular law inextricably intertwined with 
Jewish ritua1.327 The court reasoned that because the regulations im-
posed substantive religious standards on establishments purporting 
to be kosher, the administrative scheme did more than require that 
businesses under a certain type of rabbinical supervision be in fact 
under that type of supervision. Instead, the scheme required such 
establishments to adhere strictly to religious kosher standards in the 
conduct of their business, and authorized the state to monitor the 
adherence to those religious standards.328 
The court also looked at the religious qualifications of the persons 
chosen to enforce the regulations, concluding that such evidence 
clearly illustrated the sectarian nature of the regulations.329 The Chief 
of the Bureau of Enforcement was an Orthodox rabbi and the Advi-
sory Committee consisted of rabbis.330 The court explained that the 
existence of an Advisory Committee composed predominantly of Or-
thodox rabbis underscored the theological or religious nature of the 
State's regulatory endeavors.33l 
The court stated that clearly the Committee was made up as it was 
because rabbis have the expertise, education, training, and religious 
authority to interpret, apply and enforce the regulations. The court 
did not interpret the state's regulatory scheme as imposing a religious 
qualification on its enforcement personnel, and it did not hint that it 
ever would be proper to exclude followers of particular religions from 
any state body, but it could not disregard or discount the way in which 
the enforcement entities had been constituted. The court said that the 
way in which the law had been administered was a strong indication 
of the government's comprehension of its rules. The court looked to 
325 [do at 13580 
326 [do at 13600 
327 [do 
328 [do 
329 [do at 1361. 
330 [do 
331 [do 
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the administration of the kosher food regulations to help its own 
understanding of their meaning.332 The court observed that the ap-
pointment by the state of enforcement officials with religious qualifi-
cations confirmed that the regulations had a chiefly religious mean-
ing.333 Thus, the court concluded that while the state could regulate 
the advertising and labeling of kosher products, it could not impose 
substantive religious standards on those products.334 Accordingly, the 
court invalidated the regulations, remanding them to the Division of 
Consumer Affairs for reformulation.335 
Over the years, there have been several constitutional challenges 
to the validity of kosher food legislation. Until the recent Ran-Dav 
decision, courts had consistently held that kosher food laws were 
constitutiona1.336 The New Jersey Ran-Dav decision is thus the first 
to strike down a kosher food statute.337 Hence, Ran-Dav is most 
significant, since it will undoubtedly call into question the validity of 
other states' kosher food laws. It is important, therefore, to analyze 
kosher food legislation in light of both the First Amendment and the 
consumer protection concerns, for only by examining and balancing 
these concerns will the validity of kosher food laws become apparent. 
VI. KOSHER FOOD LAWS IN LIGHT OF POTENTIAL 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONCERNS 
A. Kosher Food Regulations Have a 
Predominantly Secular Purpose 
The first prong of the Lemon test evaluates whether the legislation 
was motivated by a religious purpose. To invalidate a governmental 
act under this prong of the Lemon test, the religious purpose must 
predominate. Yet, even where substantial benefits have accrued to 
religion, the courts have found governmental action consistent with 
the Establishment Clause where such action is motivated by a secular 
purpose.338 Thus, although the legislation at issue must serve a secular 
332 [d. 
333 [d. 
334 [d. at 1366--{j7. 
335 [d. at 1367. 
336 See Barghout v. Mayor, 600 A.2d 841, 849 (Md. 1992); Sossin Systems, Inc. v. Miami Beach, 
262 So.2d 28, 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Ehrlich v. Municipal Court of Beverly Hills Judicial 
District, 360 P.2d 334, 337 (1961); Hygrade Provision Co., Inc. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 501-D3 
(1925); People v. Atlas, 170 N.Y.S. 834, 836 (Sup. Ct. 1918); People v. Goldberger, 163 N.Y.S. 663, 
665--{j6 (1916). 
337 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, 608 A.2d at 1366. 
338 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 7, 
18 (1947). 
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purpose, the law's purpose may be related to religion.339 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has noted that even a statute which is motivated 
partly by a religious purpose, may satisfy the first prong of the Lemon 
test.340 
Opponents of kosher food regulations assert that the principal pur-
pose of such legislation is the observance of religious requirements.341 
These opponents contend that the purpose of kosher food regulations 
is to fulfill the strict concerns of Orthodox Jewish observance, thereby 
excluding other Jewish sects.342 The opponents argue further that in 
selecting the Orthodox Jewish religion as the standard, the govern-
ment chooses it rather than the Conservative, Reformed or Recon-
structionist Jewish sects. Opponents of kosher food legislation argue 
that, in placing its power behind one religious group, the state violates 
Establishment Clause prohibitions.343 
Opponents contend that there are far less intrusive means for pro-
tecting the kosher consumer against fraud and misrepresentation.344 
Opponents argue that kosher purveyors already have their own in-
tensive enforcement mechanism in the form of rabbinical supervision 
and internal discipline of the congregations to patronize only the 
individual congregation's approved establishments.345 Furthermore, 
the general consumer fraud statutes still control those fraudulent 
representations in the marketplace regarding religious practices 
which are not under the purview of specific regulations.346 Thus, op-
ponents of kosher food laws contend that state regulations of kosher 
purveyors already under rabbinical supervision for the purpose of 
complying with Orthodox Jewish requirements only duplicates a re-
ligious function.347 
While the contentions of those who oppose kosher food legislation 
are important, it is evident that kosher food laws, which seek to 
protect the consumer against misrepresentation in the sale of kosher 
food, clearly have a secular purpose.348 
The kosher food industry involves a vast commercial market, rep-
resenting almost $1.5 billion in annual sales. Because consumers of 
kosher food cannot readily discern whether food has been prepared 
339 See Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987). 
340 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985). 
341 Brief for Appellants at 25, Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. (No. A-5420--88T2). 
342Id. at 29. 
343Id. at 30. 
344Id. at 31. 
345 I d. at 32. 
346Id. 
347Id. at 33. 
348 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., 608 A.2d 1353, 1371 (N.J. 1992) (Stein, J., dissenting). 
236 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:201 
in compliance with kosher laws, non-kosher food could easily be rep-
resented to be kosher. Therefore, the industry is especially suscepti-
ble to fraud and misrepresentation.349 Accordingly, the predominant 
purpose of kosher food laws is to protect consumers from misrepre-
sentation, whether the consumer purchases kosher products for re-
ligious or other reasons.350 
Kosher food regulations retain their valid secular purpose despite 
their incorporation of a religious definition.351 The mere reference to 
religion does not necessarily render a statute or regulation facially 
invalid.352 An example of this is the Humane Slaughter Act.353 In Jones 
v. Butz, the Humane Slaughter Act was upheld against an estab-
lishment clause attack although it included within its definition of 
humane, slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of 
the Jewish faith.354 In Jones, the court found a valid secular legislative 
purpose in that Congress intended "to establish humane standards 
for the slaughter of livestock."355 The court concluded that even 
though the provision of the Act defining humaneness coincided with 
the method of Jewish ritual slaughter, the Act neither advanced nor 
inhibited religion.356 The incorporation of a religious definition within 
kosher food regulations merely serves the secular purpose of elimi-
nating consumer fraud.357 
The "secular purpose" prong of the Lemon test does not mean that 
the law's purpose must be unrelated to religion.358 Even if kosher food 
regulations are partly designed to accommodate consumers who buy 
kosher food for religious reasons, they would not violate the "secular 
purpose" prong because the regulations still serve the secular pur-
pose of protecting religious as well as non-religious consumers from 
fraud.359 
Thus, the first element of the Lemon test is met since kosher food 
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B. Kosher Food Regulations Neither Advance Nor Inhibit 
Religion in Their Principal or Primary Effect 
237 
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, kosher food legislation's 
principal or primary effect must neither advance nor impede relig-
ion.360 Evaluating the legislation's effect in light of the Establishment 
Clause entails a determination of whether "the challenged govern-
mental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the 
controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadher-
ents as a disapproval of their individual religious choices."361 There-
fore, even if governmental action causes some advancement of relig-
ion, there will be no impermissible effect if the effect merely coincides 
with a particular religious doctrine. For instance, in County of Allegh-
eny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Area, the Court noted that even an 
explicitly religious reference may be allowed if it conveys a secular 
message and does not communicate an endorsement of any particular 
religion.362 In this case, the Court addressed the issue of the constitu-
tionality of two holiday displays located on public property.363 Al-
though the Court found a creche display unconstitutional, it held that 
the display of a Chanukah menorah was consistent with the Estab-
lishment Clause.364 In so deciding, the Court recognized that the 
menorah was a religious symbol which served to commemorate the 
miracle of the oil as discussed in the Talmud.365 Nevertheless, the 
Court said that the menorah's message was not exclusively relig-
ious.366 Emphasizing that the menorah was the primary visual for a 
holiday which, like Christmas, has both religious and secular dimen-
sions, the Court found the menorah display constitutionally permissi-
ble.367 Thus, it is evident, that even if legislation has some effect on 
religion, it may be allowed under the Establishment Clause so long as 
it has a "secular" dimension.368 
Opponents of kosher food laws contend that the principal effect of 
kosher food regulations is to advance the religious authority of the 
360 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
361 County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Area, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (quoting 
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985». 
362 [d. at 592, 617-20. 
363 [d. at 578. 
364 [d. 
365 [d. at 583. 
366 [d. at 613. 
367 [d. at 613-14. 
368 See id. 
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Orthodox Jewish sect.369 Opponents argue that any secular impact the 
regulations may have cannot be separated from their religious im-
pact.370 Opponents also contend that the regulations violate the Es-
tablishment Clause by impermissibly providing government funds for 
inspection and enforcement which directly benefits the Orthodox 
sect.371 
Despite these contentions, kosher food regulations do not have the 
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, because they nei-
ther advance Orthodox Judaism nor disapprove other Jewish sects or 
religions in generaP72 Such regulations do not foster converts to the 
Jewish faith, for they do not require a kosher purveyor to believe in 
the Jewish religion. Also, they neither encourage purveyors to sell 
kosher food nor encourage consumers to buy kosher products.373 While 
some consumers purchase kosher food for religious reasons, the ap-
peal of kosher products has a secular dimension. Today, consumers of 
many faiths purchase kosher products for wholly non-religious rea-
sons such as health and cleanliness concerns.374 Since fewer than one-
third of the consumers of kosher food are Jewish, it is evident that 
the regulations protect a broad group of consumers and not just 
persons of a particular religion or religious sect.375 The enforcement 
of the kosher food regulations provides no direct support to any 
particular religious organization, therefore, the regulations do not 
have an impermissible effect of advancing religion just because they 
incorporate a religious definition.376 
C. Kosher Food Regulations Do Not Foster Excessive 
Entanglement of Government in Religious Matters 
Under the final prong of the Lemon test, the legislation at issue 
must avoid excessive entanglement with religion in order to with-
stand an Establishment Clause challenge.377 Determining the amount 
of entanglement necessary to invalidate the legislation is not an "ex-
369 Brief for Appellant at 34, Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. (No. A-ii420--88T2). 
37°Id. 
371 Id. 
372 See Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., 608 A.2d 1353, 1372 (N.J. 1992) (Stein, J., dissenting). 
373 See id. 
374 See id. See also Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., 579 A.2d 316, 324 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div.1990). 
375 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, 608 A.2d at 1372 (Stein, J., dissenting). 
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act science."378 The Court stresses that it is excessive entanglement 
that is prohibited.379 
Legislation which vests governmental authority in religious leaders 
or which enmeshes the State in religious controversies fosters exces-
sive governmental entanglement with religion.380 Kosher food legisla-
tion does not foster an excessive entanglement of government in 
religious matters. Opponents of kosher food laws argue that the regu-
lations foster excessive entanglement because they "impose substan-
tive religious standards and authorize the state to monitor the adher-
ence to those standards."3B1 This argument lacks merit. Kosher food 
regulations concentrate essentially on whether kosher foods offered 
for sale comply with various display and identification requirements. 
They do not address other aspects of kosher food preparation such as 
the requisite method of animal slaughter. 
The regulations are merely an unintrusive form of monitoring that 
limits the evaluation to objective judgments-not religious ones.382 An 
inspector of kosher food establishments requires no religious training 
or background to ensure that a kosher food establishment is in com-
pliance with kosher food regulations.383 Such an inspection is essen-
tially the same as that performed by an inspector investigating com-
pliance with health and safety regulations.384 Hence, the government 
does not police the religious purity of kosher food through the regu-
lations, but merely enforces one more of its consumer protection 
statutes.385 
Opponents of kosher food laws further contend that because of the 
divergent interpretation of the kosher food regulations and the exist-
ence of conflicting standards, the enforcement of the regulations will 
enmesh the State in disputes over religious doctrine.386 This conten-
tion is also devoid of merit since the regulations focus on enforcing 
compliance with the most fundamental, universally recognized re-
quirements of the kosher food laws.387 The State refrains from enforc-
ing the regulations to the extent that Orthodox Jewish authorities 
378 See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 766 (1976). 
379Id. 
380 See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982). 
381 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., 608 A.2d 1353, 1372 (N.J. 1992) (Stein, J., dissenting). 
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might dispute a particular requirement.388 Simply put, the regulations 
are merely an enactment which compels merchants who voluntarily 
sell kosher products and who advertise such to perform the agree-
ment which they have made with consumers.389 The regulations 
merely force merchants to perform a secular duty to which they 
contractually bound themselves by virtue of the fact that they repre-
sent their food to be kosher.390 Thus, the regulations are consumer 
protection laws, and they refrain from enmeshing the government in 
disputes over religious tenets.391 
Finally, the diversity of consumers who rely on purveyors' repre-
sentations that food products are in fact kosher highlights the dimin-
ishing aspect of the kosher labe1.392 Even though the kosher label was 
once a religious designation, today it serves an increasingly secular 
role in our society.393 Thus, the regulations are principally commercial 
in nature and do not involve the state in monitoring religious prac-
tices.394 
VII. KOSHER FOOD LAWS IN LIGHT OF THE 
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"395 Opponents of ko-
sher food laws contend that kosher food legislation violates the Free 
Exercise Clause because it requires kosher purveyors to adhere to 
religious practices contrary to their own beliefs.396 Opponents also 
complain that kosher food laws impinge upon the right of kosher 
purveyors to exercise their religion without governmental interfer-
ence.397 
In Sossin Systems, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach and in People v. 
Goldberger, the courts held that kosher food legislation did not violate 
the Free Exercise Clause. Instead of impinging upon the free exercise 
388 [d. 
389 [d. at 33. 
390 [d. See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138 (Ct. App. 1983) (secular terms of parties' 
binding prenuptial agreement to arbitrate any post-marital religious obligations before specified 
rabbinical tribunal, which was entered into as part of religious ceremony, were enforceable). 
391 Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138. 
392 Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., 608 A.2d 1353, 1375 (N.J. 1992) (Stein, J., dissenting). 
393 [d. 
394 [d. 
395 U.S. CONST. amend. I, (emphasis added). 
396 Respondent's Brief at 37, Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., (No. A-5420-88T2). 
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of religion, the courts in these cases reasoned that the kosher food 
laws safeguarded the observance of Jewish doctrines.398 
Furthermore, it must be noted that the sale of kosher food is a 
commercial enterprise. Purveyors of kosher food are engaged in the 
kosher food business because it is profitable, not because it is a means 
of disseminating their religious beliefs.399 Indubitably, kosher mer-
chants who advertise the sale of kosher food are not deemed to be 
promoting religious messages or seeking converts to Judaism.4°O Even 
if a merchant engages in the kosher food business out of his religious 
beliefs, the Free Exercise Clause would still be inapplicable because 
he would be engaged in religious activity. Even if some Free Exercise 
right was implicated when a merchant sold kosher food, his rights are 
not absolute. As the Supreme Court explained in Cantwell v. Con-
necticut,401 the amendment involves freedom to believe and freedom 
to act. The freedom to believe is an absolute freedom. However, the 
freedom to act is not, for conduct may be regulated for the protection 
ofsociety.402 The freedom to act must be appropriately defined in order 
to enforce that protection.403 Thus, a state has the power to enact 
legislation to regulate the times, the places and the manner of solic-
iting upon its streets, and of holding meetings therein.404 It also may 
safeguard the order of the community without unconstitutionally in-
fringing the freedoms protected by the Free Exercise Clause.405 
The kosher food regulations are aimed at the manner in which 
merchants sell kosher food instead of the religious beliefs associated 
with the consumption of kosher food. Thus, kosher food legislation 
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.406 
VIII. KOSHER FOOD LEGISLATION IN LIGHT OF 
HEALTH AND ECOLOGY CONCERNS 
A. The State's Interest in Consumer Protection 
The notion that the primary market for kosher products is com-
prised of observant Jews and that this group is protected by a group 
398 Sossin Systems, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 262 So. 2d 28, 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); 
People v. Goldberger, 163 N.Y.S. 663, 666 (1916). 
399 Respondent's Brief at 41, Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc., (No. A--5420-88T2). 
400Id. 
401 310 U.S. 296 (1939). 
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of self-regulating mechanisms407 through certifying organizations or 
local congregations is an utter misconception.408 Granted, if observant 
Jews were the only group of consumers involved, there might be no 
need for state regulation of kosher food. The fact of the matter is, 
however, that most purchasers of kosher foods are not Jewish and 
thus are in no way exposed to the self-regulating process of certifica-
tion or congregation approva1.409 Hence, absent some state oversight, 
most consumers of kosher products would be left without any protec-
tion against fraudulent practices.410 
The state, therefore, has a compelling interest in protecting the 75% 
of kosher food consumers who are non-Jews and who are thereby left 
out of the self-regulating mechanisms.411 It is important to remember 
that most non-Jewish consumers include persons who seek out kosher 
products for health and hygienic concerns.412 Persons with health 
problems such as allergies to milk products or shellfish buy kosher 
products knowing and relying on the fact that the usual bases of 
kosher designation will be observed.413 Vegetarians purchase kosher 
dairy products, and animal lovers seek out kosher food because they 
believe that the method of kosher slaughtering is more humane.414 
Other members of the general public purchase kosher products be-
cause they believe that the method of kosher food preparation, which 
is under the close scrutiny of a supervising rabbi, will lead to a high 
degree of cleanliness and hygienic fitness.415 There are important pol-
407 These self-regulating factors include: (1) If a supplier's practices diverge from the norm, 
there are immediate bulletins issued by various congregations, news services, magazines and 
the like to inform observant Jews that a particular manufacturer's products are questionable, 
and (2) the presence of large certifying organizations who inspect in addition to the particular 
supervising rabbi, or out of respect for the supervising rabbi on the basis of his certification, 
will endorse the product as conforming to religious standards. In addition to a letter "K" which 
merely notes some Kosher supervision, there are at least eight other copyrighted symbols to 
show supervision. The most common of these, an "0" with a "U" at the center is the symbol of 
the joint Kashruth Commission of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America. 
Other symbols are used to show that the product is Kosher for Passover, and still other 
designations appear on wine. Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State of New Jersey, 579 A.2d 
316,324 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). 
4()8 Letter Brief of Amici: The New Jersey Association of Reform Rabbis, the Reconstruction-
ist Rabbinical Association, the New Jersey Region of the Rabbinical Assembly, the Rabbinical 
Council of New Jersey at 3, Ran-Dav's County Kosher v. State of New Jersey, 579 A.2d 316 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (No. A-5420-8ST2). 
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icy reasons, therefore, behind the state's regulation of the sale of 
kosher food, and the state certainly has the authority pursuant to its 
police powers to protect the consuming public's health interests.416 By 
protecting consumers who purchase kosher food for health and clean-
liness concerns, the state is thereby promoting the health of its citi-
zenry, which is undoubtedly a valid exercise of its police powers.417 
Kosher food regulations serve an important state interest in pro-
tecting consumers who seek out kosher food for various reasons. 
These consumers rely on the fact that the food is actually "kosher."418 
According to 1. Klein, a contemporary authority on kashruth, the 
kosher butcher places himself in a position of trust because the people 
of the community rely on him to sell strictly kosher meat.4!9 Custom-
ers of kosher purveyors trust them not only to supply products sat-
isfying the ordinary sanitary and nutritional standards, but also to 
prepare the products in accordance with a system of dietary laws 
deeply rooted in an ancient tradition.420 By its label, kosher food items 
invite the consumer's trust and reliance.421 Each product labelled "ko-
sher" holds itself out to have been prepared according to certain 
commonly understood standards of what is "kosher." Non-Jewish ko-
sher consumers who purchase kosher products for health reasons such 
as allergies to particular foods may trust to their peril that the consump-
tion of kosher products will not be detrimental to their overall health.422 
Non-kosher products falsely designated kosher pose a uniquely 
distressing problem to the trusting kosher consumer, since he or she 
might never be able to detect that kosher food had not been prepared 
by strictly kosher standards.423 For example, if a kosher butcher 
ground into meat trimmings blood clots and veins found in the same 
tub with the meat, a kosher consumer might be unable to detect the 
presence of these forbidden substances.424 Therefore, the consumer of 
the more expensive kosher product places a great deal of trust in the 
kosher purveyor to abide by the kosher dietary laws.425 For non-Jew-
416 See Amici's Letter Brief at 3, Ran-Dav's County Kosher (No. A-5420-88T2). 
417 See id. 
418 See Amicus Brief and Appendix on Behalf of the New Jersey Association of Reform Rabbis 
et. al. in Support of Respondents at 6, Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State of New Jersey, 
579 A.2d 316 (N.J. 1990) (No. A-5420-88T2). 
419 KLEIN, supra note 102, at 348. 
420 The New Jersey Association of Reform Rabbis, et. al. Amicus Brief at 6, Ran-Dav's County 
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ish consumers, the amount of trust and reliance placed on kosher 
purveyors is even greater, for at least the observant Jewish consumer 
is protected by the self-regulating mechanisms within the congrega-
tion.426 The state has a significant interest, therefore, in ensuring that 
the kosher consumer buying food labelled "kosher" receives food 
prepared according to the kosher dietary laws.427 
B. The Preservation of Kashruth ~ Ecological Value 
The kosher dietary laws have significant ecological value.428 The 
laws conform to the scientific laws of the food chain.429 Their prohibi-
tion against consuming carnivores is ecological: by forbidding the 
consumption of carnivores, the Jewish dietary laws aid in preserving 
"balance" among animal populations.430 Furthermore, kashruth's dis-
couragement of short-term exploitation of natural resources and the 
humane method of kosher slaughter have an ecological effect on peo-
ple: they foster sensitivity to the environment and to the suffering of 
other creatures.431 The state certainly has an interest in encouraging 
long-term preservation of natural resources and sensitivity to other 
creatures. 
Without state regulation of the kosher food industry, kosher pur-
veyors might be able to pass off non-kosher food as kosher more 
easily. In turn, this could decrease the numbers ofkashruth observers, 
especially those who are non-Jews. In a society such as ours where 
violence and exploitation of natural resources abound, an observance 
which furthers sensitivity to other creatures and conservation of 
environmental resources is valuable to society, and the state should 
be able to preserve and protect the integrity of such observance.432 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Over the past decade, the number of products bearing a kosher 
label increased 1,750%. The central motivating factor behind the 
surge in the numbers of products certified kosher is that it is a 
profit-making endeavor. This profit-seeking motivation prompted the 
state of New York to pass the first kosher food legislation regulating 
42Jl See Amici's Letter Brief at 3, Ran-Dav's County Kosher (No. A~420-88T2). 
427 See id. at 11. 
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the sale of kosher food. The legislation was designed to ensure that 
profiteers did not pass off non-kosher food as kosher. Numerous states 
followed New York's example, enacting kosher food statutes modelled 
after the New York law. Since 1915, several people and organizations 
have challenged kosher food regulations on a variety of constitutional 
grounds. Prior to the most recent Ran-Dav decision, the courts had 
consistently upheld the constitutionality of kosher food laws. Ran-
Dav is the first decision which strikes down a kosher food statute. The 
majority in Ran-Dav concluded that New Jersey's kosher food statute 
violated the Establishment Clause of the federal and state Constitu-
tions. 
Ran-Dav was wrongly decided. Kosher food laws serve important 
state interests and should pass constitutional muster because they 
satisfy the three-pronged Lemon v. Kurtzman test. Kosher food regu-
lations serve the secular legislative purpose of protecting consumers 
against misrepresentation in the sale of kosher food. Kosher food 
legislation does not have the impermissible effect of advancing or 
inhibiting religion, for it does not advance Orthodox Judaism or dis-
approve other religious choices. Finally, kosher food laws do not foster 
an excessive entanglement of the government in religious matters. 
The government does not police the purity of kosher food through the 
regulations, but merely enforces another of its consumer protection 
statutes. Thus, kosher food laws satisfy the basic standards outlined 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman and should not be struck down on estab-
lishment clause grounds. 
Furthermore, kosher food laws serve significant state interests. 
The state has an interest in protecting the trusting consumer who 
seeks out the kosher designation, relying that the food is in fact 
"kosher." Since a consumer of kosher food may never be able to detect 
that the food had not been prepared by strictly kosher standards, 
misrepresentations could be detrimental to persons with allergies or 
heart conditions who purchase kosher food for health reasons. Thus, 
protecting consumers from misrepresentations in the sale of kosher 
food is a proper exercise of the state's police powers. Indubitably, 
kosher food laws should be deemed constitutionally "kosher." 
